"The sordid saga of defence acquisitions is visible in many hues—the routine surrender of capital allocated, denial of essentials to the troops, and the pendency of modernisation. It has left a chasm between what’s needed and what is made available. Whether it is bulletproof vests for the Indian Army, or modern equipment for the Indian Navy or the Indian Air Force, the brave hearts must live with promises and risk lives due to inadequacy.
The delay in acquisition of Rafale jets represents systemic sloth. As early as in 1964-65, the First National Defence Plan determined that India needed to build up 45 squadrons for the Air Force to be effective. This estimation has apparently been described as less than optimal by two different committees, the Subrahmanyam Committee and the Tata Committee, which estimated that India needed 65 squadrons to deal with the twin threats."
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